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h i g h l i g h t s
• We study bank runs in a sequential setting, where depositors can observe the action of others.
• Observing withdrawals leads to panic behavior and affects the beliefs that a bank run is underway.
• Panic bank runs occur in the absence of fundamental problems and coordination failures.
• Panic behavior is affected by loss aversion but not with risk or ambiguity aversion.
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a b s t r a c t
We provide experimental evidence that panic bank runs occur in the absence of problems with funda-
mentals and coordination failures among depositors, the two main culprits identified in the literature.
Depositors withdraw when they observe that others do so, even when theoretically they should not.
Our findings suggest that panic also manifests itself in the beliefs of depositors, who overestimate the
probability that a bank run is underway. Loss-aversion has a predictive power on panic behavior, while
risk or ambiguity aversion do not.
© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1. Introduction
Bank runs have been frequently associated to problems with
the fundamentals of the bank (e.g., Calomiris and Mason, 2003) or
viewed as a coordination failure among depositors (e.g., Diamond
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and Dybvig, 1983; henceforth D&D). We consider a sequential
version of the coordination problemembedded inD&Dandprovide
experimental evidence that bank runs emerge even in the absence
of these two problems.
In our setting, depositors observe the decision of others before
deciding whether to keep their funds deposited (henceforth to
wait) or to withdraw. Theoretically, the observability of decisions
should prevent bank runs by solving the coordination problem;
i.e. depositors without liquidity needs should wait in the unique
equilibrium. However, our findings indicate that depositors with-
draw upon observing that others do so. In such circumstances,
depositors have unreasonable beliefs about the behavior of others.
We refer to these runs that occur because of the observability of
withdrawals as panic bank runs.
Our paper complements empirical (e.g. Iyer et al., 2012; Starr
and Yilmaz, 2007) and experimental studies (e.g. Brown et al.,
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.11.014
0165-1765/© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-
nd/4.0/).
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Fig. 1. Timeline of the model.
2016; Chakravarty et al., 2014; Garratt andKeister, 2009; Kiss et al.,
2014; Schotter and Yorulmazer, 2009; Davis and Reilly, 2016) that
highlight that observing other depositors’ decisions affect with-
drawal choices. Our contribution is to highlight that panic behavior
can be regarded as a new source of bank runs and that observing
withdrawals distorts depositors’ beliefs. Besides providing clean
evidence on the existence of panic bank runs, we find that loss-
aversion is related with such panic behavior.
2. Theoretical framework
2.1. Depositors’ types, actions and order of decisions
Three depositors are endowed with 60 ECUs. Depositors invest
part of their endowment (40 ECUs) in a common bank that con-
sequently has 120 ECUs. After making their investment decision,
depositors realize that one of them needs the money urgently
(this impatient depositor is going to withdraw the deposit with
certainty), while the other two patient depositors can wait or
withdraw.
Depositors contact their bank to determine the order of de-
cisions; i.e., who will be the first, second and third depositor
in making a decision. We model this as a first-price auction in
which depositors bid simultaneously what part of their remaining
endowment (20 ECUs) they want to spend on arriving early to the
bank. These bids are intended to capture the efforts and opportu-
nity costs of depositors to have an earlier position.
Depositors are ordered depending on their bids from depositor
1 (largest bid) to depositor 3 (smallest bid).4 Once depositors
are in the line of decisions and know their position, they choose
in sequence whether to wait or withdraw. Depositors who with-
draw receive their money immediately,while depositors who wait
receive their payoff once all depositors decided. This is because
the bank carries out a project as in D&D that matures only after
the withdrawal decisions (see Fig. 1). Actions (but not types) are
observable; i.e., if a patient depositor 2 observes awithdrawal from
depositor 1 it could be due to a patient or impatient depositor,
whoever arrived first to the bank (after bidding the most).5
2.2. Payoffs
There is no uncertainty about the payoffs, thus the bank has
no fundamental problems. Depositors whowithdraw immediately
receive 50 ECUs if the bank has enough funds. That is, depositor 1
and 2 receive 50 ECUs for sure if they withdraw, while depositor 3
receives 20 ECUs if shewithdraws after twowithdrawals, but earns
50 ECUs if at least one of the predecessors waited. The bank pays
70 ECUs to the patient depositors if both of them wait. A patient
depositor who waits alone receives 30 ECUs. Table 1 summarizes
the payoffs (further details about the model, including a rationale
for the payoffs are presented in Section A1 in theOnline Appendix).
4 In case of ties, the order is randomly determined.
5 Theoretically, if decisions are sequential and depositors are rational, the order is
not important as we detail below; that is, it does not matter whether the impatient
depositor or one of the patient depositor bids more and decides first.
Table 1
Payoffs in the bank-run game.
Position Withdraw Wait
Accompanied Alone
1 50
2 50 70 30
3 50 or 20
Note. The impatient depositor is forced to withdraw because of her liquidity needs.
Patient depositors can wait or withdraw. If they wait, their payoffs depend on
whether they both wait or one does.
2.3. Equilibrium
Our payoffs resemble the coordination problem in D&D. The
two patient depositors earn the maximum payoff (70 ECUs) if they
both coordinate and wait, but waiting alone results in 30 ECUs,
thus a patient depositor in position 1 or 2 might have incentives to
withdraw and immediately receive 50 ECUs.6 Wedefine a bank run
as a situation in which at least one of the patient depositors with-
draws. In our setting, sequential rationality guarantees that patient
depositors wait in any Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, regardless
of their position and what they observe; i.e., the coordination
problem disappears.7 This is because withdrawal decisions are
observable and any patient depositor in positions 2 or 3 waits in
equilibrium if she observes a waiting. Anticipating it, a patient
depositor in position 1 will wait so as to induce the other patient
depositor to follow suit. As a result, rational beliefs imply that
any patient depositor in position 2 who observes that depositor
1 withdraws should believe that this was the impatient depositor.
Hence, a patient depositor 2 should wait in equilibrium even if she
observes a withdrawal to coordinate with depositor 3.8
Prediction. A patient depositor in position 2 waits regardless of what
she observes. In addition, she believes that any withdrawal in position
1 is due to the impatient depositor.
Note that our prediction implies that the order of decisions is
not important to our setting (and patient and impatient depositors
should bid nothing in equilibrium). This is because there is a unique
equilibrium in which both patient depositors wait, so patient de-
positors do not have any incentives to rush. If a patient depositor 2
withdraws upon observing a withdrawal, then a bank run occurs;
and this is not caused because of a fundamental problem or a
coordination failure.
3. Experimental design and procedures
A total of 156 subjects participated in our computerized ses-
sions in Spain.9 We use the strategy method. After making sure
6 Depositor 3 has a dominant strategy (waiting) if patient. This is common to
other bank run models (e.g. Green and Lin, 2003; Ennis and Keister, 2010).
7 Kiss et al. (2014) characterize the equilibrium when depositors have partial
information; i.e., not all the choices are observed.
8 For more details, see Section A1 in the Online Appendix.
9 Three sessions were run at LaTEX (Alicante) and two sessions at LINEEX (Va-
lencia). Having detected no significant differences across locations, we pooled the
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Fig. 2. Likelihood of withdrawal in each possible information setting (N = 156).
that subjects understand how payoffs are generated, we explain to
them that they will be randomly assigned a group of three at the
end of the session and that in each group one of the subjects will
be randomly assigned the role of impatient depositor, while the
other two subjects will play as patient depositors. Decisions about
waiting or withdrawing will be made in sequence, thus subjects
had to make a bid in the role of patient and impatient depositors
(this will determine their position in the sequence). After submit-
ting their bids, subjects decidedwhat to do as patient depositors in
each possible information set; i.e., subjects had to choose whether
to wait or withdraw as patient depositors in position 1, in position
2 after observing a waiting/withdrawal, and in position 3 after ob-
serving a waiting and a withdrawal or twowithdrawals.10 We also
asked subjectswhether they believed that awithdrawal in position
1 was more likely due to the impatient, the patient depositor or to
any of the types with the same probability.11 ,12
At the end of the experiment, we form groups of three and
assign the roles of patient and impatient depositors at random.We
use the bids to determine the order of play, andpayparticipants de-
pending on their strategy. For example, if the impatient depositor
has the largest bid in the group, shewill be depositor 1. Depositor 2
will be the onewith the second largest bid, andwe use her strategy
for the case in which she observes a withdrawal for depositor 1.
We also elicit risk preferences, loss aversion and ambiguity
aversion and collect information on gender, age, income and cog-
nitive abilities. Personality traits are measured using the Big-5
and the Social Value Orientation (SVO). Section A2 in the Online
Appendix contains the details on the elicitation procedures. The
experiment lasted approximately 1 h. The average earnings were
10.5 Euros.
4. Results
While subjects should bid nothing to contact the bank, we find
that subjects bid on average 7.39 ECUs. This is in line with the
results. Section A4 in the Online Appendix contains a translated version of the
instructions.
10 When observing a waiting and a withdrawal, we asked subjects what they
would do if depositor 1waited and depositor 2withdrew and the otherway around.
In line with the theoretical prediction, depositor 3 does not react differently to this
information (0.090 vs. 0.083, p = 0.808), thus we pool the results (‘‘Obs. a waiting
and a withdrawal’’).
11 Beliefs were only elicited at LINEEX (N = 84 participants).
12 Note that we needed the bidding stage before the withdrawal decisions so that
the sequence of decisions is endogenous. Without it, the order should have been
imposed exogenously, but then beliefs would obviously reflect the exogenous line-
formation mechanism.
finding that subjects overbid in first-price auctions. Importantly,
the Wilcoxon test suggests no difference between the bids of pa-
tient (7.53 ECUs) and impatient (7.25 ECUs) depositors (p = 0.408).
This, in turn, implies that the order of decisions (i.e., the position
of the impatient depositor) does not create different incentives for
patient and impatient depositors in our setting, as predicted by our
model.
Fig. 2 displays the likelihood of withdrawal for patient depos-
itors in each position. Contrary to the theoretical prediction that
depositor 2 waits regardless of what she observes we find that
depositor 2 is far more likely to withdraw when a withdrawal is
observed (57.7% vs. 5.1%, p < 0.001, Wilcoxon signed-rank test).
We interpret this as evidence of panic behavior.13
Result 1. Depositor 2 withdraws when she observes withdrawals.
In the unique equilibrium, depositor 2 should believe thatwith-
drawals in position 1 are always due to the impatient depositor
(see ‘‘Rational beliefs’’ in Table 2). However, only 34.52% of subjects
have such belief (see ‘‘Elicited beliefs’’ in Table 2).14 To further
illustrate that depositor 2 has distorted beliefs about the behavior
of the other patient depositor, we rely on our experimental data.
Fig. 1 shows that depositor 1 withdraws 20% of the times if pa-
tient, what may suggest that depositor 1 is pessimistic about the
behavior of subsequent depositors. We form all the possible banks
with 3 depositors and use the bids of subjects to determine the
order of decisions. Given the bids, 26.87% of the withdrawals in
position 1would be due to patient depositor (see the last columnof
Table 2). Statistically, patient depositors in position 2 overestimate
the likelihood that patient depositors withdraw in position 1 (p <
0.001, test of proportion). The result holds also if we split those
who replied that ‘‘the withdrawal was due to any of the two
types with the same probability’’ (47.68%) into two groups and
update the likelihood that the withdrawal is due to the impatient
depositor to be 58.36% (p = 0.019).15 ,16
13 Fig. 1 reveals also that depositor 3withdraws roughly 10% of the times. Because
depositor 3 has a dominant strategy, this can be considered as noise or irrational
behavior.
14 Depositors are less likely to withdraw when they believe that the withdrawal
was due to the impatient depositor, but differences across groups are not statisti-
cally significant according to the Wilcoxon rank-sum test (p > 0.129).
15 See Section A3 in the Online Appendix for further evidence that depositor 2
does not have rational beliefs about the behavior of other patient depositors.
16 In Section A3 of the Online Appendix we also show that if a depositor believed
that other depositors behave as she does as depositor 1, then she should assign
86.54% probability to the case that am observed withdrawal in position 1 is due
to the impatient depositor.
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Table 2
Beliefs of depositor 2 when depositor 1 withdraws.
Rational beliefs Elicited beliefs Observed (simulations)
The withdrawal is due to the. . .
. . . impatient depositor 100% 34.52% 73.13%
. . .patient depositor 0% 17.86% 26.87%
. . . any of the two types with the same probability 0% 47.68%
Table 3
Marginal effects for withdrawal decisions upon observing a withdrawal in position
2: probit regression.
(1) (2)
Risk aversion −0.115 −0.132
(0.079) (0.094)
Loss aversion 0.200** 0.199**
(0.091) (0.091)
Ambiguity aversion 0.0002 0.00002
(0.002) (0.002)
Age −0.005*** −0.014***
(0.003) (0.004)
Female −0.004 0.020
(0.110) (0.127)
Cognitive abilities 0.033 0.028
(0.041) (0.048)
Income (= 1 if above median) 0.051 0.048
(0.076) (0.067)
Big-5 No Yes
SVO No Yes
Obs. probability 0.577 0.583
Observations 144 143
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the session level.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
Result 2. Depositors overestimate the likelihood that awithdrawal
in position 1 is due to the patient depositor.
While there are no fundamental problems and depositors
should coordinate successfully in our setting, we find that (i) de-
positor 2 withdraws upon observing a withdrawal, and (ii) they
overestimate the likelihood that other patient depositor with-
draws, compared with the theoretical prediction and the experi-
mental data. These two findings support the idea of panic bank
runs.17
Next, we use a probit specification and find that more loss
averse/younger subjects in position 2 are more likely to withdraw
when they observewithdrawals, ceteris paribus (see Table 3). These
results reinforce the findings in Trautmann and Vlahu (2013) on
the explanatory power of loss aversion in a bank run context and
suggest that more attention should be devoted to the study of loss
aversion during bank runs episodes.
5. Conclusion
While traditional explanations for the occurrence of bank runs
are based on fundamentals and coordination problems, we high-
light that panic bank runs may occur as well. Policies devised to
17 In their theoretical paper, Chen and Hasan (2008) refer to panic bank runs
as those that occur by changes in depositors’ expectations of the bank-specific
information process, thus they do not consider the observability of actions as a
possible source of ban runs.
avoid bank runs, such as the deposit insurance or suspension of
convertibility, must take into account this possibility.
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